Britain, today, does not have a coherent defence and security policy. Parliament is not interested – the only MPs who turn up to defence debates are the ones on the Defence Select Committee, and they are chiefly interested in defence industrial policy i.e. getting jobs for their own constituencies. (Americans, with their gift for the pithy turn of phrase, would call this pork.) The MoD is not interested in defence – the civil servants who run the place are merely on their way to higher and greater things: a Deputy-Secretaryship at Health, a Permanent-Secretaryship at Transport, maybe a nice quango. The Government is not interested, which is why the Minister of Defence is a part-timer. The Foreign Office, which ought to be in charge of upholding British interests to foreigners, mainly sees its job as representing foreign interests against Britain. The public is not interested – understandably so: abroad is a long way away for most people, and no-one in authority is giving any kind of lead. Consequently we blunder from one crisis to the next, and always the PBI to bail us out. Here is one piece of evidence to that effect.
But this is nothing new. Very few British politicians of the past century have had any kind of strategic vision. They have mostly regarded defence as something nasty and embarrassing, best avoided. That was already becoming true even before 1914, and since 1918 has been the default setting. Only a handful of Prime Ministers (certainly no other Ministers) have had any kind of vision or focus. Churchill, Attlee, Thatcher and Blair were lucky, in a sense – they had a clear-cut issue before them and an over-riding priority to pursue. Attlee and Blair had the job (which they actually did well) of setting the parameters for British policy at the start of a long conflict: Churchill and Thatcher found their conflicts already running and simply determined on a more vigorous prosecution thereof. But even they had to work in a context of a substandard defence industrial capacity, to name but one impediment.
Enough carping. What would a sensible security policy look like? In the first place, it would require a bigger stick. And here I realise that the problem is not something that can be addressed simply at the policy level – for instance, by putting the military requirement first in procurement decisions, rather than (as at present) putting political and economic requirements first (which is how we end up with overruns and overspends as with Nimrod, Apache, SA80A1, Typhoon etc. etc. etc.). The problem comes earlier, with the shared presuppositions about defence held by politicians, bureaucrats, commentators and the public.
The first issue is about the very nature of the armed forces. What is the value the nation receives from money spent on army or fleet? Is it wasted if we spend a lot of money on a weapons system (and on the training of the crew needed to operate it) that rarely or never sees action? No-one would dream of saying, ‘well, we spent hundreds of pounds last year insuring the house. It didn’t burn down, so obviously that was money wasted’. Because that is just what the forces do: they insure.
One of the most witless things I have read in recent years was a comment – where I now forget – that the European foreign policy elite sees war as the failure of policy whereas the US policy elite sees military action as a potential tool of policy. The writer seemed to think this showed the superior wisdom and humanity of the EU. It is superficially attractive, but, as I say, witless. It is witless because it leads one to pretend that a policy is working long past the point where it has in fact become actively damaging. If one gets to the point where the choice is a) persistence in a failed policy which allows an open enemy to grow stronger or b) war, then it is far from obvious that (a) is the right choice (though it might be under certain special circumstances). Yet it is the choice that the Euro-outlook predisposes towards, since (b) is pre-defined as failure.
Such an outlook actually makes war (and warlike acts, such as hostage-taking, which has been openly practised in recent years against British subjects by tyrannical governments such as Iran and Sudan without consequences) more likely, by emboldening one’s enemies and making them think they can get more than you are prepared to give. The Euro-outlook only makes sense if one assumes that everyone is reasonable and has reasonable demands. It is a matter of common knowledge that this is not so. The demands of the Southern slaveholders of 1860 were not reasonable; the demands of the Communists and Fascists were not reasonable; the demands of the IRA or the Argentine Junta were not reasonable. (Here I define ‘reasonable’ as ‘respecting the Golden Rule’, that is recognising that the other party has legitimate rights and concerns of equal value to one’s own.) The demands of the Iranian theocracy are not reasonable, and they are not alone in their unreasonableness.
If the Euro-outlook became general throughout all the world, of course, it would be a good thing. But it is not general today. We may need all the insurance we can get.